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Abstract
The eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) brought and will bring full membership 
to countries whose trade barriers with the EU had to a large extent already been removed 
under Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) during the 1990s. We employ a theory-based new 
version of a gravity equation, whose specification allows for an assessment of the impact of 
the arrangements on extra- and intra-group imports. We find robust evidence that the 
agreements have substantially increased intra-group trade, in the case of the Czech and Slovak 
Republic at the expense of the Rest of the World (ROW).*
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11. Introduction
Since 1989 Europe has been the stage of an ongoing process of regional integration involving 
the EU15 and ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).1 The admission of eight
CEECs to the European Union (EU) on 1st May 2004 represented a temporary peak in the 
integration process, but it was not the end of it. Bulgaria and Romania will join the EU from 
January 2007 after almost 15 years of preferential trade relations guided by Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). The bilateral elimination of trade barriers and the subsequent increase in 
these countries’ total exports to the EU raised the question if the EU integration process has 
caused and will in the future cause negative effects for third countries.
Theoretically, the issue is closely related to Jacob Viner’s influential work The Customs 
Union Issue, in which it was first pointed out that the preferential nature of trade deals 
generates both trade creation and trade diversion (Viner 1950). However, the second-best 
nature of FTAs renders the empirical work on this subject so challenging that for most 
arrangements it is hard to say “whether trade creation outweighs trade diversion” (Clausing 
2001).
While most studies assessing the impact of bilateral arrangements on trade flows make use of 
the gravity equation, only few specifically point to the geographical restructuring of trade 
flows arising from the implementation of FTAs between the EU and the CEECs. In this paper, 
we will employ a new version of a theory-based gravity equation to reveal to which extent 
factors like transport costs or exchange rates have influenced the geographical shift of trade 
flows. The specification allows for an assessment of the impact of the FTAs on trade creation 
1 In this paper, the CEECs are the group formed by the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
2and trade diversion. Employing panel data estimation techniques, we find that the FTAs with 
the CEECs have boosted EU imports from these two countries by up to 63%.  
In section 2, we present some stylised facts, which emphasise the need for investigating the 
trade effects of the FTAs with the CEECs. Section 3 briefly lays out the concept of trade 
creation and trade diversion. Section 4 expounds the theoretical model, which builds the basis 
for the estimated equation. Sections 5 deals with econometric and data issues. We present the
estimation results in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. Development of trade flows: Stylised facts
The first formal instruments of integration were bilateral FTAs signed between the EU15 and 
each CEEC, which became known as the Europe Agreements (EAs). Since the EAs had to go 
through a longsome process of ratification by each individual member state, the European 
Community (EC) gave provisions on trade and trade-related measures effective by the means 
of Interim Agreements already at an earlier stage.2 Nevertheless, tariff reductions under both 
type of agreements have been carried out gradually. Therefore, one needs to look at the entire 
timeframe from 1991 to 2003 to make statements about the agreements’ effects on 
international trade.
A simple calculation helps to depict the relative change in the aggregate imports of EU15 
countries from the CEECs and from the Rest of the World (ROW) during the EU integration 
process of the candidate countries. To render the sizes of the two geographical regions 
2 As being subject to Art. 133 of the EU treaty (Common Trade Policy), the Interim Agreements fell under the 
Community’s Competence. Details on the exact dates of entry into force of the agreements are provided in table 
A.1 in the appendix.
3comparable, the yearly import values have been normalised with respect to the base year 
(1991). Taking the quotient allows then to assess relative changes. To be precise, the 
development of imports from the CEECs ( CEECsM ) and from the ROW ( ROWM ) since 1991
has been calculated as follows:
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- Figure 1 about here -
Looking at figure 1 it can be readily seen that in 2003 the growth rate of EU imports from the 
CEECs is over three times higher than the growth rate of imports originating from the ROW. 
Moreover, the relative boost seems to have taken place steadily and continuously since the fall 
of the iron curtain until the accession of eight CEECs to the EU in 2004. 
These stylised facts match our a priori expectations surprisingly well. Indeed, during the time 
trade liberalisation guided by the FTAs deepened, EU15 countries’ imports from the CEECs
increased substantially relative to the imports originating in the ROW. However, a detailed 
econometric analysis of the import flows is necessary to separate the individual agreements’ 
effects from the various other factors that may have influenced the imports of the EU15’s 
individual member states during the observed time span.
43. On the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion
Theoretical insights in allocation effects of FTAs were first given by Viner (1950) and Byé 
(1950) arguing that a fractional reduction of trade barriers leads only to a shift, but not to an 
elimination of the discrimination of different sources of supply. Viner named the resulting 
effects trade creation and trade diversion.
Trade creation is then associated with the portion of the new trade between member countries 
that is wholly new resulting in an improvement in the international resource allocation. It 
occurs when subsequent to the formation of a customs union, domestic production at high 
costs is replaced by lower-cost sources from the new partner country. Trade diversion refers 
to the part of the new trade between member countries that is only a substitute for trade with 
third countries. It describes a situation in which the preferential trade liberalisation causes 
higher-cost production from the new partner country to replace imports from low-cost sources 
in the ROW. In this case, the resource allocation is worsened. The concepts of trade diversion 
and trade creation in their original version refer only to producers and consumers inside the 
FTA area. Trade diversion can, however, seriously harm excluded countries, in particular, 
when they are confronted with such a large trade bloc as the EU. 
Attempts to find general circumstances under which the positive effects from trade creation 
surpass the negative consequences from trade diversion following the implementation of an 
FTA have been subject to much controversy. One of the few surviving criteria is the natural 
trading partner hypothesis, stating that an FTA among prospective members of a regional 
grouping that are already major trading partners would reinforce natural trading patterns 
instead of diverting them (Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). Thus, trade creation should dominate 
for the FTAs with those countries that were at the time of the implementation of the 
5agreement already well integrated into the EU (figure 2). A quick look at the EU imports over 
GDP ratios for the CEECs suggests that the FTAs with Slovenia and the Baltic countries
(except for Lithuania) to be less harmful to the ROW than the FTAs with Hungary, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.
- Figure 2 about here -
On the other hand, one could argue that countries that were less integrated before the FTAs 
have benefited the most from signing them. Figure 2 reveals the biggest growth of imports
over GDP ratios for those countries that signed the FTAs in the early 1990s (particularly 
Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and virtually no or even negative growth for the 
Baltic countries and Slovenia, who entered into the FTAs some years later (compare table 
A.1). Again, whether these gains can be attributed to the FTAs must be subject to a more 
formal econometric analysis. 
4. Theoretical foundation of the gravity equation
Researchers use the Vinerian terms frequently when examining empirically the consequences 
of preferential liberalisation for third countries. Most studies formally assessing the impact of 
any kind of integration arrangement make use of the gravity equation (see e.g. Bayoumi and
Eichengreen 1995, Frankel and Wei 1998, Soloaga and Winters 2001 or for a more recent 
study Carrère 2006). Even though the gravity equation’s initial success stemmed from its 
good empirical properties, it possesses nowadays “more theoretical foundations than any 
other trade model” (Baldwin 2006). The repeated ignorance of which has, however, produced 
6a number of commonly-accepted mistakes in gravity model estimation, so that we attach 
importance to laying out briefly the derivation of the equation we are going to test.
Assuming identical, homothetic Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences and 
“iceberg” type transport costs, country i’s aggregate total value of imports from country j can 
be expressed as
σ−






=
1
i
ij
ijij P
p
YNM with  
σ−






=
1
i
ij
ij P
p
s (2)
with jN  representing the variety of products sold by country j and iY being country i’s 
nominal expenditure.
i
ij
P
p
 is the relative price determining the share of country i’s 
expenditure spent on country j’s goods ijs  with iP being country i’s price index for all import-
competing goods and ijp  standing for the ‘landed’ price. σ is the above-unity elasticity of 
substitution between goods originating from country i and country j.3 Since prices on 
individual goods are hardly available, we define the landed price 
ijjijij ePtp =      (3)
as a function of bilateral trade costs ijt , country j’s producer price index jP  and the nominal 
exchange rate ije .
4  Substituting (3) into (2) yields
3 Usual estimates of σ  range from 5 to 8. Consequently a rise in the relative prices by 1% would cause the total 
import value to fall by 4 to 7%.
4 An exchange rate variable has first been formally introduced into the gravity equation by Bergstrand (1985).
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as the real exchange rate. Equation (4) already looks close to commonly estimated gravity 
equations. However, as stated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), bilateral trade does not 
solely depend on bilateral trade costs, but also on the average resistance to trade with the rest 
of the world. Only by considering these multilateral terms, it can be explained why a certain 
region is pushed towards trade with a given partner when barriers towards all trade partners 
increase. Employing general equilibrium conditions has the convenient side effect of 
eliminating the number of varieties jN , for which data is not on-hand.
5 Producer prices in 
country j must then adjust, such that
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Recalling equations (2) and (3), we can solve for jN as follows:
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, we obtain our testable gravity equation
5 Annex A.2 describes the case for a restricted country sample.
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where country i’s total imports from country j are not only dependent on the relative incomes 
of the two countries but also on their bilateral exchange rate and trade costs relative to country 
i’s average trade costs and exchange rate with respect to all trading partners. 
In line with the basic idea behind gravity models that the intensity with which a pair of 
countries trades is subject to pull and push factors, we adopt a broad interpretation of the 
bilateral and multilateral trade resistance terms and assume the unobservable ijt to be a log-
linear function of a set of observable variables,6
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where ijD  as the great-circle distance between the importing and the exporting country, )( jiLL
as dummy variables being equal to 1 if country i (j) is landlocked and 0 otherwise and ijB  as a 
dummy variable being equal to 1 if country i and j share a common border and 0 otherwise 
influence trade costs by serving as proxies for a transport cost variable. Supposing that 
cultural proximity beats down the landed price through transaction cost savings, the dummy 
variable ijCL  equals 1 when the importer and the exporter have the same official language and 
6 Compare Mélitz (2005) for a similar interpretation of the bilateral trade cost variable.
90 otherwise. Finally, ijDEP is a dummy taking the value of 1 whenever country j is a non-
independent entity being legally associated with an independent state and 0 otherwise.7
In contrast to the work by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), equation (7) does not describe 
multilateral resistance through relative price terms, but through all variables that also 
influence the bilateral resistance to trade. Their partially time-varying character overcomes 
the bias present in earlier estimations that solely rely on country pair fixed effects to resemble 
the multilateral resistance terms.8 Following Baier and Bergstrand (2006), we define 
multilateral and world resistance as
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where ijt  includes all elements as defined in equation (8) except for the landlocked dummies.
9
The first two terms on the RHS represent the multilateral trade resistances of the respective 
trading partners. Holding bilateral trade costs constant, a rise in these terms implies a lower 
ratio of bilateral to multilateral trade costs and thus a boost of bilateral trade. The last term, 
however, resembles the world resistance to trade and as such, lowers the trade value between 
every pair of countries.10 The opposite interpretation of the multilateral and world resistance 
terms holds, of course, true for trade stimulating factors, like cultural proximity or trade 
arrangements.
7 This includes French Polynesia and New Caledonia for France, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles for the 
Netherlands and Bermuda and the Cayman Islands for the United Kingdom.
8 Baldwin (2006) provides an exhaustive discussion of this problem.
9 The FTA dummies are summarized to one variable.
10 To give an example, for the distance variable this means that a higher distance of the trading partners i and j 
towards all other countries in the sample increases country i’s imports from j, whilst a high world distance 
(everyone is far away from everyone) lowers trade between every country pair.
10
To separate the ex-post effects of the FTAs with the individual CEECs, a set of stepwise 
dummy variables has to be included into the theoretically derived gravity equation.
ijFTA = 1 for the contracting parties for the years following the entry into force of the 
Interim Agreements and 
= 2 for the years following the entry into force of the EAs (intra-bloc bias)
to capture the impact of the FTAs on intra-group trade and 
iFTA = 1 for non-contracting parties for the years following the entry into force of 
the Interim Agreements
and
= 2 for the years following the entry into force of the EAs (extra-bloc 
openness)
to capture the impact of the FTAs on trade of group members with non-members.11
Following this specification, we will be able to examine whether the FTAs were only trade 
creating (they caused trade between the EU and the associated countries to increase above the 
normal levels without changes in trade with third countries) or trade diverting (they increased 
intra-group trade at the expense of lower trade with third countries).
Taking into account the modifications of the theoretically derived equation discussed above, 
the log-linearised12 reduced-form gravity equation boils down to
11 The countries are grouped by dates of entry into force of the Interim and the Europe Agreements. See table 
A.1 for details.
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is absorbed into the constant term α 13, common to all years and all country 
pairs, ijtε  is the i.i.d. error term and the expected coefficient signs are
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5. Econometric issues and data
In accordance to the findings of Egger (2002), panel data methodology is applied. First, and in 
contrast to cross-section analysis, panels enable us to capture relevant relationships between 
variables over time. Second, they allow monitoring unobservable country-pairs individual 
effects. Cheng and Wall (2004) further demonstrate that not controlling for country 
heterogeneity yields biased estimates. The country-pair effects will be treated as fixed, since 
the random effects model only yields consistent estimates when the unobservable bilateral 
effects are not correlated with the error term. The conducted Hausman test, however, clearly 
rejected null-hypothesis of no correlation. The relevant fixed effects (FE) regression thus 
12 The brackets after 4β  and 6β  indicate that the dummy variables included in ijt and ijMWR will not be log-
linearised whereas distance of course, will.
13 Since wY  is constant we implicitly assume no world growth, although countries i and j may grow. As a 
consequence, we assume that the positive growth of some countries is cancelled by the negative growth of others 
so that the world as a whole does not grow.
12
gives unbiased estimates of the time-varying variables (reported in column 1 and 2 of table 1 
and 2), nevertheless, to provide comparability, we also present the estimated parameters of the 
random effects (RE) and the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) regressions. The 
latter has been developed by Plümper and Troeger (2004) and equals a stepwise fixed effects
estimation technique, rendering the estimation of the time-invariant variables possible. We 
further detected heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the error terms and corrected for it
in all regressions. Finally, we controlled for a possible selection bias by including three 
variables that approximate the Heckman correction term: HC1 is a variable containing the 
number of years of a trading pair in the sample; HC2 and HC3 are dummies, taking the value 
of 1 if the trading pair is observed over the entire period 1991 to 2003 and if the trading pair is 
present in the sample in t-1, respectively (and 0 otherwise).14
As for the data, we consider EU15 countries’ imports from a worldwide sample of 204 
countries15 over the period 1991-2003, forming an unbalanced panel data set with roughly 
32245 observations. The data sources and definitions of all variables entering the tested 
gravity equation are listed in table A.4 in the appendix.
6. Results
The results of the regressions with and without the multilateral and world resistance terms are 
presented in table 1. The respective first columns show the regression results omitting the 
multilateral terms. Except for some FTA dummies, all parameter estimates of the relevant 
fixed effects model show the expected sign and are highly significant. As for the traditional 
14 The empirical estimation also contains an EU dummy, controlling for the accession of Austria, Sweden and 
Finland in 1995 only.
15 For the complete country list see table A.3 in the appendix.
13
gravity variables, the positive parameter estimates for GDP indicate that the import value
increases with the importer’s GDP due to a higher import demand and with the exporter’s
GDP raising due to a higher export supply. The coefficients are, however, somewhat away 
from the theoretically predicted unitary elasticity. Note that the theoretically justified 
inclusion of the real exchange rate exhibits empirical importance as well. A 10% depreciation 
(e.g. a rise in the exchange rate) of the importing country’s currency against its trading 
partner’s currency reduces the import value from the latter by 2.8%. Moving to the fixed 
effects vector decomposition regression, we find that our distance coefficient of -1.34 lies 
within the usual range.16 Being landlocked reduces the bilateral imports by 52% for country i 
and 77% for country j not having access to the sea. Being legally dependant on the importing 
country and sharing a common language significantly boost the propensity to trade. 
Looking at the results of the regressions including the multilateral terms, we find a positive 
coefficient on the average exchange rate variable, indicating that imports from a certain 
trading partner increase nearly proportionally to a depreciation of the importing country’s 
currency against all other currencies. A 10% rise in country i’s geographical distance 
(remoteness) from all other trading partners pushes it to trade 13% more with country j. 
Dependency does not seem to matter on a multilateral basis and border effects also play 
quantitatively a minor role in this sample. The coefficient on the multilateral language 
variable, however, does not show the expected opposite sign of its bilateral counterpart. This 
is due to the last term on the RHS of equation (9), the world resistance term, dominating the 
multilateral terms. Thus, in the world as a whole, there are many common languages 
facilitating trade between every pair of countries and outweighing possible negative 
consequences for bilateral trade of the multilateral language variables. 
16 The elasticity of transport costs to distance is usually associated with an estimate in the range of 
4.02.0 1 << δ  (Limao / Venables 2001).  Combined with an average estimate of 7=σ , a distance 
coefficient between -1.2 and -2.4 would be suggested.
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- Table 1 about here -
Turning to the interpretation of the FTA coefficients, the results display the meaningfulness of 
the agreements for the CEECs’ integration into the EU. In the fixed effects regression without 
the MWR terms, four out of five dummy variables argue for a significant boost of the EU15 
countries’ imports brought about by the agreements. Most trade has been created by the FTAs 
signed with the Baltic countries (63% above the normal level). The arrangement is also the 
only one featuring extra-bloc openness. It increased EU imports from the ROW by 15%. The 
result for the Czech and Slovak Republic agreement is somewhat mixed. While it led to 40% 
more imports than what would have been predicted by the baseline-scenario gravity model, it 
has reduced imports from third countries by 8%. For none of the other agreements, effects on 
third countries could be detected.
In general, the results keep holding true when the multilateral resistance terms are included. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the coefficients of the FTA dummies (as well as the GDP 
and distance measures) move up in the second set of regressions. As laid out by Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006), estimates of currency union dummies are likely to be biased if the relative 
price terms are omitted. Since we rely on a fixed effects model, even in our first regression, 
only the time-variant part of the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) terms is ignored. The two 
time-varying multilateral terms we include in our second regression are negatively correlated 
with bilateral trade and also with the other variables included in ijt . Thus, omitting the 
average exchange rate ant the multilateral FTA dummy biases our estimates of the bilateral 
FTAs downwards. So, moving to the estimation results of the true model in columns 2, 4 and 
6 of table 1, we find that the agreements with the CEECs actually have created between 11% 
15
and 25% more trade than suggested by the regression ignoring the time-varying component of 
the relative price terms.
The trade creation and trade diversion elasticities seem to roughly confirm the natural trading 
partner hypothesis introduced in section 3. The implementation of the FTAs with previously 
little integrated countries like the Czech and Slovak Republic was not without costs for third 
countries. On the contrary, the Baltic countries were relatively well integrated into the EU by 
the time of the entry into force of the agreements (compare figure 2). As shown in table 1, the 
FTAs with them exhibit the best performance concerning intra- and extra-bloc trade creation. 
However, the estimation results for the other FTAs do not further strengthen this suggestion.
The intuition that less integrated countries profited most themselves from the establishment of 
FTAs cannot be confirmed by the regression results. Consequently, the imports over GDP
ratios rather support the natural trading partner hypothesis, although the data is not very clear 
cut here either.
Table A.5 shows the results for different country groupings, allowing thereby for a better 
comparison to previous studies. The parameter estimates underline the robustness of the 
previous estimation. The FTA coefficients on an aggregate level confirm the results obtained 
on an individual basis. All CEECs taken together, the Interim and Europe Agreements 
boosted EU imports from that region 65% above the otherwise predicted level without 
affecting third countries. 
Evaluating our results in the context of other East-West trade studies, we find that our FTA 
coefficient for all CEECs of 0.5 (thus, indicating a trade creation elasticity of 65%) lies just 
amidst the wide range of previous parameter estimates (table 2).
16
- Table 2 about here -
The huge differences stem from different specifications of the gravity equation, varying 
estimation techniques, country samples and time spans. Closest to our procedure appear the 
approaches of Adam, Kosma and McHugh (2003) and De Benedictis, de Santis and Vicarelli 
(2005). The smaller elasticity of the former may stem from the fact that the authors used 
exports instead of imports and also from distinct time spans. They include only five years 
from 1996 to 2000 into their regression and are, thus, not able to capture the entire effect of 
the Interim Agreements. While using a similar time span to ours, De Benedictis, de Santis and 
Vicarelli (2005) leave Romania and Bulgaria out of their focus. The estimate they provide 
does therefore not contain, the trade created by the EA with these two countries. Finally, both
studies rely on time-invariant country (pair)-specific fixed effects to account for the 
multilateral resistance terms. Since part of the resistance, namely the average exchange rate
and the multilateral FTA variable, are time varying and negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable, however, the results are very likely to be downward biased.
7. Conclusions
This paper has paid particular importance to theoretically deriving a new version of a 
correctly specified gravity equation to avoid biases present in previous studies. We were able 
to show that the frequently employed exchange rate variables do stand on a sound theoretical 
ground and exhibit econometric importance. In addition, new measures for multilateral trade 
resistance were introduced and mostly showed the expected coefficient signs in the empirical 
estimation.
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Looking at the agreements on an individual country basis gives additional important insights: 
the FTAs have supported and accelerated the CEECs’ integration into the EU. The process 
has not been free of charge, however. We find evidence that although each FTA created new 
trade within the trade bloc, the increase has in the case of the Czech and Slovak Republic
been at the expense of imports from the ROW. The fact that these countries were not well 
integrated with the EU at the time of the entry into force of the agreements gives some 
support to the natural trading partner hypothesis. As for the aggregate trade effects of the 
Interim and Europe Agreements, our result is in line with previous estimates by Adam, 
Kosma and McHugh (2003). However, we believe that the authors underestimate the 
agreement’s effect since they only partly eliminate the omitted variable biases. 
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Appendix
Table A.1: Dates of entry into force of the Interim and the Europe Agreements
Dummy Country Interim 
Agreement
Europe 
Agreement
Hungary March 1992 February 1994
hupoFTA
Poland March 1992 February 1994
Czech Republic March 1992 February 1995
visegradFTA
czslFTA Slovakia March 1992 February 1995
Romania December 1993 February 1995
robuFTA Bulgaria May 1993 February 1995balkanFTA
svFTA Slovenia July 1997 February 1999
Estonia January 1995 February 1998
Lithuania January 1995 February 1998
CEECsFTA
balticsFTA balticsFTA
Latvia January 1995 February 1998
Source: Council of the European Union (2006).
A.2: Adjusting the model to a limited number of importing countries
In this study, we have to adjust our theoretical framework to the case of EU15 countries’ 
imports (countries i) from a worldwide sample of countries (countries j). Say, that there exist r 
other importing countries ∑∑∑
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, whose import prices can 
be described analogously to country i as
rjjrjrj ePtp =           (A.1)
Under general equilibrium conditions, output in country j must then equal the aggregate 
expenditure spent by countries i and r on varieties produced in j,
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Plugging (A.3) into (1), country i’s imports arise as
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 will be absorbed in the 
constant. E.g., we assume a co-movement of the average exchange rate and trade costs of 
country r against j and the average exchange rate and trade costs of country i against j as well 
as a constant world GDP. 
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Table A.3: Country list
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bahamas  
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Central African Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo  Dem. Rep.
Congo  Rep.
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Faeroe Islands
Fiji
Finland
France
French Polynesia
Gabon
Gambia 
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guam
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong 
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran  Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea  Dem. Rep.
Korea  Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao
Macedonia  FYR
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mayotte
Mexico
Micronesia  Fed. Sts.
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
N. Mariana Islands
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Samoa
San Marino
S. Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia-Montenegro
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Rep.
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Em.
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Virgin Islands (U.S.)
West Bank and Gaza
Yemen Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Table A.4: List of variables
Variable Definition Source
ijtM Yearly imports of country i from 
country j
OECD ITCS
tjiY )( Importer and exporter GDP (in 
current US$)
UN NAMAD
ijtre Bilateral real exchange rate UN NAMAD (nom. exchange rates), IMF 
IFS (price indices and GDP deflators), own 
calculations18
ijD Great circle distances between 
the respective trading pairs 
CIA World Factbook, own calculations
based on the harvesine formula
)( jiLL Dummy = 1 if the country is 
landlocked
CIA World Factbook
ijB Dummy = 1 if the county shares 
a common border with the EU
Wikipedia
ijDEP Dummy = 1 if country j legally 
depends on country i
CIA World Factbook
ijCL Dummy = 1 if the trading 
partners share a common official 
language
Wikipedia
ijtFTA Dummy = 1 for contracting 
parties for the years following 
the entry into force of the 
Interim and = 2 for the years 
following the entry into force of 
the Europe Agreements
Council of the European Union
itFTA Dummy = 1 for non-contracting 
parties for the years following 
the entry into force of the 
Interim and = 2 for the years 
following the entry into force of 
the Europe Agreements
Council of the European Union
18 When available the producer or consumer price index has been used for the calculation of the real exchange 
rate, in all other cases we reverted to the GDP deflator.
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Table A.5: Robustness checks
FE FEVD
(1) (2) (1) (2)
itYln 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.41***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
jtYln 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.69***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
ijtreln -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.36***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
ijDln -2.20*** -2.19***
(0.03) (0.03)
ijB -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
iLL -0.81*** -0.87***
(0.03) (0.03)
jLL -1.44*** -1.45***
(0.02) (0.02)
ijDEP 1.23*** 1.24***
(0.14) (0.14)
ijCL 0.95*** 0.94***
(0.03) (0.03)
iEU 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.24***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
iCEECstFTA 0.50*** 0.50***
(0.05) (0.03)
itFTA (CEECs)
19 0.02 0.02**
(0.02) (0.01)
ivisegradtFTA 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.08) (0.05)
ibalkantFTA 0.45*** 0.45***
(0.06) (0.04)
ibalticstFTA 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.07) (0.04)
itFTA (Visegrad) -0.05 -0.05
(0.05) (0.04)
itFTA (Balkan) 0.06** 0.06**
(0.03) (0.03)
itFTA (Baltics) -0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
ijtavre 0.76*** 0.63*** 0.76*** 0.63***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.02) (0.02)
ijMWD 1.29*** 1.30***
(0.04) (0.04)
19 Since the dates of entry into force of the agreements differ for the countries in the aggregate, we had to take 
the “mean” years in assigning the values of 1 and 2 to the dummies measuring the extra-bloc openness.
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ijMWB 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00)
ijMWCL 1.63*** 1.41***
(0.08) (0.08)
ijMWDEP -1.13 -1.87
(1.26) (1.26)
ijtMWFTA -0.37*** -0.33*** -0.37*** -0.33***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
HC1 0.60*** 0.60***
(0.01) (0.01)
HC2 -1.87*** -1.86***
(0.05) (0.05)
HC3 -0.08** -0.02 -0.08* -0.02
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Observations 32245 32245 32245 32245
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Own calculations.
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Figure 1: Relative changes in EU imports
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Figure 2: EU integration in the years of the entry into force of the Interim and the 
Europe Agreements
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Table 1: Estimation results
FE RE FEVD
w/o MWR with MWR w/o MWR with MWR w/o MWR with MWR
itYln 0.25** 0.46*** 1.02*** 0.99*** 0.25*** 0.46***
jtYln 0.67*** 0.71*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 0.67*** 0.71***
ijtreln -0.28*** -0.38*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.28*** -0.38***
ijDln -0.86*** -1.86*** -1.34*** -2.21***
ijB 0.00 -0.00** 0.00*** -0.00***
iLL -0.43*** -0.56*** -1.04*** -0.74***
jLL -0.59*** -0.57*** -1.44*** -1.47***
ijDEP 0.74 1.68*** 0.96*** 1.22***
ijCL 1.39*** 0.77*** 1.07*** 0.96***
iEU 0.05 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.14** 0.05** 0.22***
irobutFTA 0.45*** 0.60*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.45*** 0.60***
ihupotFTA 0.27** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.35***
iczsltFTA 0.34*** 0.44*** 0.13* 0.08 0.34*** 0.44***
isvtFTA 0.04 0.14** 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.14***
ibalticstFTA 0.49*** 0.62*** 0.55*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.62***
itFTA (Ro, Bu) 0.09 0.10* 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.10
itFTA (Hu, Po) -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09
itFTA (Cz, Sl) -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.19** -0.19***
itFTA (Sv) -0.03 -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.03 -0.08***
itFTA (Baltics) 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.14** 0.14**
ijtavre 0.91*** -0.20*** 0.91***
ijMWD 1.21*** 1.30***
ijMWB 0.00*** 0.03***
ijMWCL 2.06*** 1.88***
ijMWDEP -11.91*** -0.39
ijtMWFTA -0.31*** 0.21*** -0.31***
HC1 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.65*** 0.60***
HC2 -1.89*** -1.59*** -1.91*** -1.91***
HC3 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Observations 32245 32245 32245 32245 32245 32245
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.71 0.72 0.91 0.91
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 2: Trade creation elasticities in previous studies
TC elasticity Estimation technique
Adam, Kosma and McHugh (2003) 32% Panel two-step FE
De Benedictis, de Santis and Vicarelli (2005) 11% Panel two-step GMM
Martin and Turrion (2001) 129% Panel FE
Paas (2003) -70% Cross-section
Lasser and Schrader (2002)* 266% Cross-section
* Baltic states’ imports from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands
Source: Own illustration.
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